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Combating corruption in Ukraine 
– the beginning of a long march 
Marta Jaroszewicz, Piotr Żochowski
From a public opinion point of view, corruption has been the gravest problem of today’s 
Ukraine, excepting the armed conflict in the east of the country. The government  might be 
able to delay certain key reforms such as the constitutional reform or the reform of local 
government structures, however, without stepping up measures to combat corruption they 
would face the risk of losing social support  which has already been  weak. There is no sin-
gle strategy for combating corruption in Ukraine. What has been implemented is a series of 
often contradictory concepts and actions (initiated by the president’s office, the government, 
civil society institutions, or launched to meet the requirements of donors). The successes of 
the new government have included efforts aimed at fighting corruption at the middle level 
of government and the introduction of legislative changes in compliance with international 
practice. The main weaknesses, on the other hand, have been the lack of efficient mechanisms 
to implement the adopted legislation to ensure that an individual charged with corruption 
(regardless of political connections) could be effectively tried and the money received as bri-
bery could be returned to the state. Similarly, the judiciary system has not been prepared to 
actively handle corruption cases.
Corruption in Ukraine
Europe’s main anti-corruption convention, i.e. 
the Council of Europe’s 1999 Civil Law Conven-
tion on Corruption, defines corruption as “re-
questing, offering, giving or accepting, directly 
or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advan-
tage or prospect thereof, which distorts the 
proper performance of any duty or behaviour 
required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue 
advantage or the prospect thereof”1. Corrup-
tion can take various forms: from the most ba-
sic one such as bribery, through embezzlement 
of public property, nepotism and clientelism, to 
appropriation of state institutions by corrupt 
networks. There is no single recipe for combat-
1 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, ETS no. 174; Ukraine 
ratified the Convention in 2005.  
ing corruption effectively. Some countries focus 
on the harsh penalisation of corruption crimes 
and increasing the effectiveness of the system 
of detecting and punishing corruption-related 
offences. Other countries emphasise the need 
for state institutions to function transparently, 
including giving citizens unrestricted access to 
public information and making public assets 
declarations pertaining to state officials. The 
most widely-used instruments aimed at fighting 
corruption typically include: the penalisation of 
various aspects of corruption, the creation of 
an effective system of combating corruption 
free from external influence, the confiscation of 
property obtained by way of corrupt practices, 
a reduction in all immunities which hamstring 
the prosecution of corruption-related offences, 
and the introduction of anti-corruption provi-
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sions to rules and regulations pertaining to the 
work of public officials.
Corruption in the West is different than that ob-
served in Ukraine. In the West, the main form of 
corruption involves using private money to exert 
influence on public officials to persuade them 
to make certain desired decisions. In Ukraine, 
on the other hand, corruption takes the form 
of transferring public money to private com-
panies2. Moreover, in Ukraine corruption is not 
just a system anomaly, but it forms an integral 
part of the system of the state’s functioning. 
There are several levels of corruption: low-level 
corruption (related to the everyday life of citi-
zens), corruption at the middle level of govern-
ment and large-scale political corruption. As 
far as the latter is concerned, two phenomena 
are typical of contemporary Ukraine: the ac-
tual takeover of state institutions by corrupt 
networks, and also politicians’ dependence on 
big business and the sponsoring of political 
parties by oligarchy groups. During Viktor Ya-
nukovych’s presidency Ukraine was one of the 
most corrupt states in the world (in 2014 it was 
ranked 142nd out of 176 states in the Transpar-
ency International Corruption Perception In-
dex). The years 2010–2013 can be referred to as 
a period of actual  illegal takeovers  of key state 
institutions by Yanukovych and his immediate 
circle, aimed at appropriation as much funds 
from the state budget as possible.
New trends
The change of power in Ukraine has eliminated 
a number of the so-called ‘corruption schemes’ 
associated with the old government. However, 
several significant problems have been left unre-
solved. Firstly, corruption in Ukraine is of an insti-
tutional nature. It has produced a system of in-
formal relations of the authorities vs. the citizen 
and of the subordinate vs. the superior occur-
ring from the highest level of government down 
2 R. Karklins, ‘Typology of Post-Communist Corruption’, 
Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 2002. 
to the local level. Secondly, politicians continue 
to be dependent on the oligarchs who sponsor 
them or in fact are oligarchs themselves who 
get involved in politics in order to pursue their 
business objectives. Thirdly, the outbreak of the 
armed conflict in the east of Ukraine and the emer-
gence of the uncontrolled territories has facilitat-
ed the emergence of new corruption schemes. 
Corruption has been the main cause for soci-
ety to be disillusioned with the policy pursued 
by the new government. According to the re-
sults of an opinion poll conducted in January 
2015 by the Kyiv International Institute of So-
ciology, commissioned by the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 
weekly, nearly 80% of the respondents claimed 
that corruption has remained unchanged after 
the change of power or that it has increased 
in scale. Meanwhile, the main objective of the 
Revolution of Dignity was to combat corrup-
tion3. Similarly, entrepreneurs have complained 
that corruption and criminal ‘corporate raiding’ 
(taking companies over by force on the basis 
of counterfeit documents) have been the main 
cause for investors’ reluctance to locate their 
investments in Ukraine, alongside the dire eco-
nomic situation of the country.
Unlike under Yanukovych, currently there is no 
publicly available evidence for direct corrupt ac-
tivities carried out by top-level Ukrainian politi-
cians. Just like during the previous government’s 
rule, accusations of corruption are mainly being 
formulated towards individuals operating at 
the interface of public administration and the 
energy sector. These individuals reap profits 
3 For more on this topic see T. Piechal, ‘Disappointment and fear 
– the public mood in Ukraine’, OSW Analyses, 14 January 2015; 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-14/
disappointment-and-fear-public-mood-ukraine
Corruption in Ukraine is of an institution-
al nature. It has produced a system of 
informal relations of the authorities vs. 
the citizen.
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mainly from dubious intermediary activities in 
the field of purchase, sale and the processing 
of fuels; and from obtaining rebates, licences or 
loans from the state which they are not entitled 
to. Another practice which has been observed 
involves the heads of certain public institu-
tions or publicly owned companies persuad-
ing employees to move their current accounts 
to banks associated with these principals or 
to buy state-owned land for next to nothing. 
Other very frequent corruption schemes occur-
ring in government offices and state-owned 
companies include: inflating the value of pub-
lic tenders to transfer excess money obtained 
in the tender procedure to private accounts, 
as well as managers forcing their subordinates 
to make unofficial monthly payments to their 
superiors. These types of practices were men-
tioned in the charges brought against the head 
of State Service for Emergency Situations and 
his deputy, both of whom were detained on 
25 March 2015 during a government meeting. 
Tax offices, fiscal monitoring as well as the cus-
toms service, militsiya (i.e. the equivalent of 
the police force in Ukraine) and other institu-
tions involved in issuing permits and licences 
have been considered the most corrupt state 
administration bodies. According to the www.
slidstvo.info website, systemic corruption still 
persists on Ukraine’s borders and for each car-
go to efficiently pass customs clearance the 
so-called otkat (Ukr. vitkat; or ‘share’) must be 
paid. Average citizens are most affected by cor-
ruption in militsiya structures, including traffic 
police. The scale of corruption in law enforce-
ment structures has been indirectly confirmed 
by words spoken by Ukraine’s prime minister, 
Arseniy Yatsenyuk recently. In late February 
he demanded that the interior minister clean 
up the situation in the militsiya, at the same 
time accusing the ministry itself of becoming 
an “organised crime group”4. New corruption 
schemes emerged when the war in eastern 
Ukraine broke out. These include the practice of 
bribing conscription boards to exempt specific 
individuals from military service or of Ukrainian 
officials offering bribes in exchange for being 
granted the status of a counter-terror operation 
veteran (which exempts them from the compul-
sory lustration)5. 
Measures undertaken
No major modifications in the state’s anti-cor-
ruption policy were made immediately after the 
change of power in Ukraine. This delay has been 
caused by the process of the new political order 
being formed (2014 saw both presidential and 
parliamentary elections) and by the fact that 
the government has focused on carrying out 
military actions in eastern Ukraine. It was only 
in autumn 2014 that legislative changes and 
slow practical changes in combating corrup-
tion in public institutions were launched. In De-
cember 2014, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted 
a new government agenda which for the first 
time contained an entire chapter devoted to 
‘new’ anti-corruption policy. In recent months, 
actions aimed at bringing officials associated 
with the previous regime to justice have been 
intensified. At the same time, the government 
launched institutional changes including in par-
ticular the formal establishment of the Nation-
al Anti-Corruption Bureau. However, there has 
been significant delay in implementing these 
changes. A reform of the prosecutor’s office 
and of the ministry of the interior is under way. 
Public tender procedures have also been modi-
fied. The increased activity of civil society activ-
4 After http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/yatsenyuk-poruchil-ava-
kovu-provesti-kadrovye-chistki-v-mvd-24022015123000
5 Details on lustration below. 
Accusations of corruption are mainly be-
ing formulated towards individuals oper-
ating at the interface of public adminis-
tration and the energy sector.
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ists and journalists is also worth noting. They 
have managed to expose a number of corrup-
tion scandals and launch the project of com-
piling publicly accessible databases to disclose 
public officials’ assets.
Legislative changes 
The most important measure aimed at cutting 
the links between the new government and the 
corrupt regime established by Yanukovych was 
the adoption in September 2014 of a law to 
clean up the government (lustration law)6. The 
law was an attempt at combining political lustra-
tion (the verification of officials in terms of their 
possible involvement in illegal decisions taken 
by the Yanukovych regime and of officials who 
cooperated with the Communist system) with 
a top-down dismissal of corrupt officials associ-
ated with the previous government. Pursuant to 
this law, certain categories of officials (e.g. the 
prime minister, individual ministers and heads 
of other central offices, prosecutors and judges, 
top-ranking military personnel) were subject to 
a ban on holding public office for ten years if 
they had held these posts during the presidency 
of Viktor Yanukovych (lower-level officials faced 
a five-year ban). Some lower-level public servants 
would not be automatically dismissed; instead, 
they would be subject to individual lustration. 
The advantage of the law is that it has made it 
possible to dismiss a large number of corrupt 
officials, which would not otherwise have been 
possible due to the inefficient judiciary. The dis-
advantages, however, have included the risk that 
the withdrawal from the system of proving each 
individual’s guilt in a separate trial may be con-
trary to the provisions of the Ukrainian constitu-
tion. Another weakness of the law is that due to 
purely opportunistic reasons, lustration is not in-
tended to cover officials directly elected to their 
posts (the president, members of parliament 
6 For more see T. A. Olszański, ‘The Ukrainian Lus-
tration Act’, OSW Analyses, 1 October 2014; http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-10-01/
ukrainian-lustration-act
etc.). Whether the law proves to be an efficient 
anti-corruption mechanism will be evident once 
it is fully implemented. Heads of specific state in-
stitutions are responsible for the enforcement of 
the law, and the overall coordination of the pro-
cess has been tasked to the Ministry of Justice. 
Currently, after nearly a year of the law being in 
force, it is evident that it is being observed to 
a varying degree: in some offices it has been en-
forced, whereas in others officials falling within 
the provisions of the law still hold their posts. 
Another measure taken was the adoption of 
a package of anti-corruption laws in October 
2014 which included laws: on the National An-
ti-Corruption Bureau, on preventing corruption 
and on the fundamentals of anti-corruption pol-
icy of Ukraine for the years 2014–2017. Adoption 
of these regulations was a condition for Ukraine 
to receive macroeconomic aid from the EU and 
fulfil the EU’s requirements concerning visa-free 
regime7. The law on the National Anti-Corrup-
tion Bureau (NACB) provides for the creation of 
a specialised body to protect public order by 
prosecuting corruption-related offences com-
mitted by public servants8. Both the law on pre-
venting corruption and the law on the funda-
mentals of anti-corruption policy have the form 
of documents/political platforms rather than 
laws introducing legal standards. Nonetheless, 
their adoption triggered the implementation of 
several significant changes. In late March 2015, 
7 EU releases €250 million of grants to support Ukraine, 
Brussels, 13 June 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-14-676_en.htm
8 ‘Zakon Ukrainy pro Natsyonalne Antikoruptsyine Byuro 
Ukrainy’, Vidomosti Verkhovnoy Rady, 2014, No. 47, 
p. 2051, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1698-18
The law on the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau (NACB) provides for the creation 
of a specialised body to protect public 
order by prosecuting corruption-related 
offences committed by public servants.
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the National Agency for the Prevention of Cor-
ruption was established at the Ukrainian gov-
ernment with the task of verifying the assets 
declarations submitted by public officials. Oth-
er changes have also been planned to increase 
the state’s transparency, including: opening up 
access to the state register of real property, the 
creation of a state register of individuals who 
have committed corruption-related offences 
and the introduction of special anti-corruption 
screening procedures for public servants. Anoth-
er important measure has been the introduction 
of provisions making it possible to temporarily 
confiscate the property and assets of individuals 
suspected of corruption. This, for example, will 
make it possible to confiscate illegally obtained 
assets belonging to former president and prime 
minister, both of whom fled to Russia9. 
The adoption in April 2014 of an amended public 
procurement law was another significant change 
in the fight against corruption. According to EU 
experts, the new law has been largely conver-
gent with EU practice, in particular in terms of 
reducing the number of exceptions in which 
the public tender procedure can be omitted10. 
Anti-corruption investigations 
No Ministry of Justice data on corruption-relat-
ed investigations launched in 2014 is publicly 
available. According to statistics compiled by 
the General Prosecutor’s Office and made avail-
able to the media, between January and Octo-
ber 2014 approximately 2,000 corruption-relat-
ed investigations were launched (pursuant to 
two major corruption-related provisions of the 
criminal code)11. In 2013, the figures were large-
ly similar. The difference, however, is that inves-
9 ‘Zakon Ukrainy pro zapobiganiya koruptsyi’, Vidomosti 
Verkhovnoy Rady, 2014, No. 49, p. 2059, http://zakon2.
rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1700-18/page; ‘Zakon Ukrainy 
pro zasady dyerzhavnoy antikoruptsyonnoy polityki w 
Ukrainy na 2014-2017 roki’, Vidomosti Verkhovnoy Rady, 
2014, No. 46, p. 2047, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/1699-18
10 EU Cooperation News, 16.12.2014, http://euukrainecoop.
com/2014/12/16/eu-state-building-contract/
11 http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2014/12/05/1345413.html
tigations launched in 2014 concerned former 
prominent representatives of the Yanukovych 
regime or public officials currently holding rel-
atively important posts. Previously, corrup-
tion-focused investigations had mainly targeted 
lower-level officials holding posts in local gov-
ernment or in regional branches of central gov-
ernment offices, public servants at the lower lev-
el of central government or militsyia officers12.
Immediately after the revolution, investigations 
were launched focusing mostly on the former 
president and former prime minister and their 
closest relatives involved in the illegal practice 
of transferring state-owned assets abroad. 
The process of disclosing offences committed 
against middle level officials in ministries, pub-
lic institutions and local government bodies has 
also started slowly (Ukrzaliznytsia, the Ministry 
of Health, the fiscal service, customs service, lo-
cal government units responsible for the sale of 
state-owned land etc). This has been possible 
mainly due to initiatives by social activists in-
volved in combating corruption.
It was only in recent weeks (when the general 
prosecutor changed13) that the general prose-
cutor’s office launched several new investiga-
tions targeting former officials associated with 
Yanukovych (though corruption charges, which 
are the hardest to prove, were not a priority). 
The investigations launched included those fo-
cused on Oleksandr Yefremov (former leader of 
a faction within the Party of Regions), Mykhailo 
12 Transparency International Ukraine, ‘Alternativnyi zvit shodo 
otsinki efektivnosti dyerzhavnoy antikoruptsyonnoy polity-
ki”, 2015, http://ti-ukraine.org/system/files/docs/news/alter-
natyvnyy_zvit_shchodo_ocinky_efektyvnosti.pdf
13 Vitaliy Yarema was replaced with Viktor Shokin.  
The National Agency for the Prevention 
of Corruption was established at the 
Ukrainian government with the task of 
verifying the assets declarations submit-
ted by public officials.
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Chechetov (a prominent Party of Regions politi-
cian), and Yuriy Kolobov (former minister of fi-
nance). Similarly, in March 2015, the most con-
troversial judges who adjudicated in the cases 
of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko were 
dismissed from their posts. In March 2015, cor-
ruption charges were brought against several 
high-ranking officials currently in office. These 
included the head and the deputy of the State 
Service for Emergency Situations, and the head 
of the State Financial Inspection. Due to profes-
sional negligence the head of the State Road 
Traffic Inspection at the Ministry of the Interi-
or was also dismissed. Moreover, in April 2015 
the Higher Committee for the Qualification of 
Judges dismissed five judges suspected of cor-
rupt practices, depriving them of their immuni-
ty and opening the way for criminal investiga-
tions to be launched against them. 
Institutional changes  
Until the beginning of May 2015 none of the 
specialised institutions to combat corruption 
planned in the legislation had been established 
in practice. Therefore as under the previous 
government, the operational and investiga-
tive activities are being carried out by the Min-
istry of the Interior and the Security Service of 
Ukraine (SBU) which cooperate with the pros-
ecution authorities. In recent months, these 
institutions increased their activities related to 
combating corruption. One of the reasons be-
hind this has been the significant delay in the 
forming of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau. 
Due to this delay, the Ukrainian government 
decided to launch an anti-corruption offensive 
using the current institutional structure. This 
has been confirmed for example by decisions 
made by Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to raise the 
salaries of employees of the Ministry of the In-
terior involved in combating corruption or to 
form anti-corruption flying squads14. Increased 
14 http://www.mvs.gov.ua/mvs/control/main/uk/publish/
article/1427611
activity has also been noticeable in the general 
prosecutor’s office. In recent weeks, it launched 
a dozen or so new anti-corruption investiga-
tions. However, social activists involved in fight-
ing corruption have made numerous accusations 
towards the Ukrainian government. According 
to them, the current increased activity is not of 
a systemic nature but has been the result of 
‘manual control’ over law-enforcement agencies 
by the prime minister and the president aimed at 
quickly achieving spectacular effects15. 
The degree to which a specific institution is able 
to combat corruption externally also depends 
on whether it has a capacity to effectively elim-
inate corruption from its internal structures. 
Certain measures in this respect have been 
taken by both the Ministry of the Interior and 
the prosecutor’s office. According to data from 
the Ministry of the Interior, in 2014 20,000 of-
ficers were dismissed from their service in the 
militsiya (with a further 20,000 to be dismissed 
this year). This is aimed at making it possible to 
raise the wages of the rest of the employees to 
discourage them from taking bribes. A reorgan-
isation of the State Road Traffic Inspection (the 
‘traffic militsyia’ – DAI) was carried out includ-
ing its incorporation into the patrolling service. 
Open competitions for some posts in the new 
traffic police have been announced and a re-
form of the system of paid services rendered by 
the Ministry of the Interior (e.g. the issuing of 
documents) has been launched to reduce the 
15 Shabunin. 
The current increased activity, accord-
ing to social activists, is not of a systemic 
nature but has been the result of ‘manual 
control’ over law-enforcement agencies by 
the prime minister and the president aimed 
at quickly achieving spectacular effects.
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scale of corruption16. As far as the reform of the 
prosecutor’s office is concerned, the amended 
law on the prosecutor’s office of February 2015 
has introduced a number of significant changes 
from the point of view of combating corrup-
tion coupled with a review of how dependent 
the prosecutor’s office is on political influence. 
These changes include: eliminating the dubious 
task of exerting general supervision over entre-
preneurs and natural persons from the scope of 
duties of the prosecutor’s office, introducing the 
obligation for official orders from a superior to 
their subordinates to be formulated in writing, 
and expanding the scope of self-government17. 
The head of the general prosecutor’s office has 
also announced a reduction in the number of 
prosecutors, which will make it possible to raise 
the salaries of the remaining employees and 
to introduce an electronic documents system 
(a very significant change from the point of 
view of the transparency of decisions).
Pursuant to the law on preventing corruption, 
public officials have been obliged to submit 
annual publicly accessible assets declarations 
(by 1 April each year). Still, however, there is no 
mechanism to verify these statements. This is due 
to delays in launching the operation of the Na-
tional Agency for the Prevention of Corruption.
Civil society measures 
Social activists and journalists supported by 




17 ‘Zakon Ukrainy pro prokuratury’, Vidomosti Verkhov-
noy Rady, 2015, No. 2-3, p. 12, http://zakon2.rada.gov.
ua/laws/show/1697-18 Implementation of this law was 
originally intended for late April. However, it has been 
postponed until July 2015. 
ti-corruption initiatives, have continued to play 
an important role in exposing cases of corrup-
tion. Moreover, non-governmental experts have 
taken an active part in legislative work on new 
anti-corruption laws. Civil society organisations 
(including Transparency International Ukraine, 
the Centre for the Prevention of Corruption, the 
Reanimation Package of Reforms) and special-
ised journalistic and social initiatives (Slidstvo.
info, Nashi Groshi, Koruptsyi Nii, Ukrayinska Pra-
vda) are able to analyse and publish information 
on suspicious assets owned by public officials 
or expose cases of corruption at the middle lev-
el of government. It is obvious, however, that 
without operational capabilities and access to 
foreign data, they are unable to disclose cases 
of large-scale corruption, for example to trace 
money transferred by the Yanukovych regime. 
Social activists have also raised society’s aware-
ness of corruption. This has been possible due 
to their active involvement in civil society groups 
at specific ministries. In some regions, activists 
have also been employed by the SBU. 
Cases of abandonment and delay 
At present, Ukraine has had a relatively coherent 
legal base in the field of combating corruption. 
The main problem of Ukrainian legislation, how-
ever, has continued to involve the clash between 
individual legal standards, the arbitrary nature 
of numerous legal provisions, and the lack of 
executive regulations to the adopted laws. Insti-
tutional weakness has continued to be one of 
the major problems of Ukraine’s anti-corruption 
policy. Serious delays, or even cases of abandon-
ment, in the process of forming new anti-cor-
ruption institutions, have been clearly evident. 
What is equally important, however, is the col-
lapse of the Ukrainian judiciary expected to try 
individuals charged with corruption. 
The National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
Ukraine has witnessed significant delays in the 
forming of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
There is little reflection as to how the insti-
tution will function or on the competences 
planned for prospective investigators.
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(NACB). According to the adopted legislation, 
the NACB was to be formed in January 2015.
However, it was not until mid-April 2015 that 
the head of the Bureau was appointed18, and 
so far no recruitment of employees has been 
announced. This generates the risk that the 
NACB might not start its operations this year, 
especially since – pursuant to the law on the 
NACB – strict recruitment requirements have 
been introduced. Meanwhile, the creation of 
a professional, politically independent office 
to combat corruption may be the long-await-
ed system change which could be followed by 
other similar developments. Should the NACB 
fail to perform its role, the fight with corrup-
tion will continue due to the involvement of 
civil society activists and investigative activists. 
Delays in the forming of the NACB seem to be 
the result of the excessive importance the gov-
ernment attached precisely to the appointment 
of the bureau’s head (more than 170 candidates 
submitted their applications in the first stage of 
recruitment). Meanwhile, there is little reflec-
tion as to how the institution will function or 
on the competences planned for prospective in-
vestigators. This is confirmed by the very struc-
ture of the law on the NACB: most provisions 
concern the system of appointing the bureau’s 
head. It is also possible to have reservations re-
garding the wording of the NACB’s mission: the 
bureau is intended to combat corruption only 
among high-ranking central and local govern-
ment officials. However, the emphasis should 
rather be placed on the scale of economic 
damage suffered by the Ukrainian state (this 
concept was the underlying principle of the 
provisions of the Polish law on the Central An-
ti-Corruption Bureau). This purely clerical word-
ing of the mission of the new bureau may be an 
obstacle in carrying out investigations targeted 
at oligarchs or businesspeople involved in brib-
ing public officials. 
18 Artyom Sytnyk, legal counsel and former prosecutor, 
has been appointed to that post. 
Other institutions 
The future of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s 
Office and the State Investigative Bureau is 
unclear, even though Ukrainian legislation re-
quires these institutions to be established (in-
cluding the law on the prosecutor’s office and 
the 2012 code of criminal proceeding). The new 
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office would be 
intended as a response to the problems posed 
by the lustration of prosecutors – prosecutors 
or officers of law enforcement bodies employed 
in the current anti-corruption units would be 
banned from taking posts in the new institu-
tion. Currently, however, the Ukrainian govern-
ment mentions the need to form this special-
ised prosecutor’s office with ever diminishing 
frequency. Moreover, there are no executive 
regulations concerning its establishment. On 
the other hand, the State Investigative Bureau 
would be expected to be a special investigative 
body dealing with complex criminal cases (in-
cluding investigations against militsiya service-
men; it is unclear if the target group would also 
include officers working for the anti-corruption 
bureau). The Security Service of Ukraine current-
ly holds these powers and would cease to be 
a special service dealing with economy-related 
crimes; it would instead focus on tasks strictly 
related to counter-intelligence actions and the 
protection of constitutional order. There is seri-
ous concern that the powers of the NACB and 
the new investigative body might overlap.
The process of creating the National Agency 
for the Prevention of Corruption has reached 
a more advanced stage: in March 2015 the Cab-
inet of Ministers passed a relevant resolution19. 
An open competition for agency board mem-
bers is underway; however, no recruitment 
of employees has been announced. The new 
agency has mainly been vested with coordi-
nation and preventive tasks. Its key task in the 
field of combating corruption involves collect-
19 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/118-2015-%D0%BF
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ing and verifying assets declarations submitted 
by public officials. Also in this case considerable 
delay should be expected ahead of the new 
agency becoming operational – it will probably 
be unable to verify statements submitted this 
year (which are being submitted according to 
the new standards). 
Cleaning up the judiciary
Reforming the judiciary has been a key chal-
lenge for Ukraine’s future. However, this issue 
reaches far beyond the framework of the an-
ti-corruption policy. After the reform of the 
judiciary carried out by President Yanukovych 
in 2010, judicial independence was seriously in-
fringed, and the president’s influence on bodies 
of judicial self-government or individual judges 
was increased. This has caused an increase in 
the scale of judicial corruption and a surge in 
criminal cases launched by political order. After 
the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s parliament 
enacted two laws on lustration (including one 
limited only to judges) which were intended to 
help clean up the judiciary. The lustration re-
sults have proved insufficient – the judges sub-
ject to lustration frequently continue to hold 
their posts due to legal loopholes. Administra-
tive paralysis has spread to major institutions 
of the judiciary such as the Higher Council for 
Justice or the Higher Committee for Qualifica-
tion of Judges. In January 2015, the parliament 
passed a law on securing the right to a fair tri-
al. The law was intended to break the deadlock 
within the judiciary, for example by introducing 
the re-attestation of judges, increasing the role 
of judicial self-government, introducing the 
principle of open competitions. These changes 
are in compliance with the recommendations of 
the Venice Commission, but they also increase 
the risk of current corruption schemes being 
preserved. It seems that a complete renewal 
of the composition of judicial self-government 
bodies could be an effective method for com-
bating corruption in the judiciary. Self-govern-
ment could launch obligatory screening proce-
dures to be carried out in the case of suspected 
corrupt practices among judges. Other recom-
mended courses of action are: the requirement 
to organise open competitions when recruiting 
judges at all levels of the judiciary, to promote 
a further toughening of disciplinary measures 
pertaining to judges, and the introduction of 
the electronic documents system20. 
Conclusions
(1) The Ukrainian government’s approach to 
combating corruption (corruption has been 
ranked second after defence of independence 
on the list of national challenges) confirms pos-
itive changes in the awareness of the problem 
among the political elite. Most probably, this is 
largely due to growing pressure by society, by 
civil society activists and to international pres-
sure. The process of abandoning the superficial 
approach to adopted legal solutions (which 
is typical of the Ukrainian political scene) has 
been clearly evident.
(2) Most legal solutions passed by the new 
Ukrainian government have been in compliance 
with international practice. However, real suc-
cesses in the fight against corruption can only 
be confirmed when these solutions are fully im-
plemented. Ukraine has been witnessing signif-
icant delays in the process of forming the new 
institutional system to combat corruption. The 
delays in forming the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau and in devising a system of verification 
of assets statements submitted by public offi-
cials are difficult to understand (civil society ac-
tivists have been emphasising this for months). 
(3) The most significant challenge continues to 
be the need to renew personnel. This process 
is expected to take years, especially given that 
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part of the employees of law enforcement bod-
ies or of the judiciary. However, it is realistic. It 
would be worth considering whether this pro-
cess should continue to be based on the prin-
ciple of lustration. Perhaps currently it would 
be better to organise open competitions more 
frequently, to carry out obligatory verification 
of employees’ skills and a similar screening pro-
cedure for possible corruption. 
(4) In recent months there has been an increase 
in activities aimed at combating corruption at 
the operational level. However, the anti-corrup-
tion investigations which have been launched, 
in particular those relating to crimes committed 
by representatives of the former regime, should 
have been launched last year. The more time 
passes, the more difficult it will be to return the 
illegally appropriated assets to the state trea-
sury. The fact that the anti-corruption powers 
are vested in ‘old’ institutions such as the Minis-
try of the Interior, the SBU and the prosecutor’s 
office poses a risk that the process of forming 
the NACB will be delayed further still and that 
the bureau itself will operate under conditions 
of rivalry for specific powers. 
(5) The system to combat corruption current-
ly being formed has the fundamental flaw of 
placing its emphasis on state bureaucratic 
structures and limiting its focus on the middle 
level of government officials. Meanwhile, active 
steps need to be taken to combat corruption 
among representatives of private businesses, in 
particular in the context of public tenders and 
of the actual supervision of private business-
people over state-owned property. 
(6) The precondition of success in the fight 
against corruption in Ukraine involves carrying 
out a reform of the judiciary, including increas-
ing the scale of detectability of corrupt prac-
tices among judges, limiting the immunity of 
judges suspected of corruption and reducing 
the level of tolerance for all aspects of corrup-
tion among judges.
